THE EUTHYPHRO PROBLEMS

The Rosamond Kent Sprague Lecture in Ancient Philosophy

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The so-called Euthyphro Problem raises the following question: do the gods love the pious because it is pious, or is the pious pious because it is loved by the gods? The traditional reading draws on Divine Command Theory: does God recognize or create value? A contemporary version rephrases the problem along similar lines: is value attitude-independent or is it conferred by attitudes? Dr. Vogt argues that these approaches obscure the dialogue's argument by reformulating "the" Euthyphro Problem as if all value had the same metaphysics. According to the Euthyphro, however, there are three kinds of value, exemplified by the good, the god-loved, and the pious. Among these values, the good has priority. This comes into view once we see that there is not one Euthyphro Problem, but three. The Epistemic Euthyphro Problem seeks a measure by which disagreement about the good can be resolved. The Bad Gods Problem asks how the gods can be normative guides, given that they fight and disagree with each other. The Metaphysical Euthyphro Problem, as I call "the" Euthyphro Problem, raises the question of whether a property can at the same time be realist and constitutively involve relational attitudes. On this reconstruction, the Euthyphro is the urtext of metaethics, in ways that go far beyond its common reception. Plato's three kinds of value accommodate many of the intuitions that today we think speak for and against realism, and for and against anti-realism. According to the Euthyphro, realist value is prior, but it is not the only kind of value that orients our actions. There is also anti-realist value such as the god-loved and legal, and realist/anti-realist value such as the pious and the lawful.

Friday, March 5th, 2021, 3:30pm via Zoom email christopher.tollefsen@gmail.com for Zoom details